About Project
Risk and Threat Perception in the Indo-Pacific
In the few years since the term Indo-Pacific was introduced to the broader international community, it has quickly emerged as a central focus in shaping the future of the global order, both now and in the years ahead. Countries and organizations far beyond the region's geographic boundaries have increasingly placed the Indo-Pacific at the heart of their foreign policies and strategic agendas, whether explicitly or implicitly. As a result, the region has be-come a focal point of international attention. Yet, the responses to developments in the Indo-Pacific are far from uniform. There are notable differences in how various stakeholders interpret and act upon these changes. Moreover, the broader understanding of these differences, including their underlying causes, remains limited—particularly even within foreign and security policy circles.
This gap in understanding is particularly evident among external actors, such as at times the United States, despite being arguably the key non-resident stakeholder, and countries in Europe as well as the European Union. They often lack a comprehensive grasp of the region's complexities. Even within the Indo-Pacific itself, there are significant gaps in awareness, including among experts and decision-makers.
In 2020, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Korea Office launched a project to explore the regional policy discussions in the Republic of Korea. At that time, the South Korean government was cautious and somewhat reluctant to incorporate the Indo-Pacific into its own policy dictionary, despite its central role in the regional strategies of friendly neighbors and its key ally, the United States. Through a series of exchanges with a select group of experts as members of the KAS Indo-Pacific Advisory Group Korea, decision makers in Seoul and peers from Australia, India and Japan, we sought to understand the motivations behind South Korea's nuanced approach to the Indo-Pacific. The primary driver of differences in comparison to others —often seen as gaps between like-minded partners— appeared to be rooted in distinct assessments of risks and threats to their national interests.
Building on this understanding, we expanded our efforts by engaging with KAS partners across the region, with the support of our offices in Bangkok, Hanoi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Singapore. We sought to deepen our understanding of the diverse risk and threat perceptions held by different countries, broadening our insight into the factors influencing their national policies toward the Indo-Pacific. The discussions proved illuminating, and the collective insights gathered from these exchanges underscored the importance of strengthening communication and collaboration on these issues.
In this volume, we are pleased to present a selection of findings from these efforts. Each contributor has been asked to identify and analyze the three most pressing risks or threats to their country's national interests as they relate to their foreign and security policies in the Indo-Pacific. The concise papers presented here aim to provide readers with a deeper understanding of the relevant context, regional dynamics, and varying perspectives on these issues. While the specifics of the arguments and terminology may differ depending on the country, the overarching focus on risk and threat in relation to national interests allows for a comparative analysis, promoting mutual under-standing of how these perceptions shape regional policies. These factors, though they may seem familiar to insiders, remain critically important. Ignoring them when crafting bilateral or multilateral initiatives could have serious consequences. In a time of increasing geopolitical complexity, it is more essential than ever to better understand the priorities and concerns of our regional partners.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the contributors to this volume. They include long-standing KAS partners across the Asia-Pacific, such as Amador Research Services / FACTS Asia, which has been working with KAS on national security priorities in the Philippines, Chulalongkorn University, a trusted partner for regional affairs in Thailand, and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, which regularly enhances KAS conferences globally. Additionally, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a long-time partner in Tokyo, and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, a cornerstone of KAS's political dialogue efforts in Singapore, have also been key collaborators. We also extend our thanks to the Korean Association of International Studies / Catholic University of Korea, completing this distinguished group of contributors. My gratitude also goes to the KAS colleagues across the region who connected us to these invaluable sources of knowledge. Special thanks must also go to the members of the KAS Indo-Pacific Advisory Group Korea for their continued support and guidance throughout this project. Finally, I want to acknowledge the exceptional efforts of Sangah Yoon, Project Manager #KAS4Security at the KAS Korea Office, whose dedication and commitment were instrumental in bringing this project to fruition.
It is important to note that the writing for this project was conducted in mid-2024, prior to the U.S. Presidential elections and other significant events that may influence regional security and global order. The outcomes of these events will no doubt be a subject for future discussions and may necessitate further updates to the analyses presented here.
For now, we hope this publication provides both an engaging and thought-provoking reading experience, contributing to a deeper understanding of Risk and Threat Perception in the Indo-Pacific.
When the KAS Korea Office first introduced me to this project, I was immediately intrigued. The idea of assembling a dialogue around how different countries perceive threats in the Indo-Pacific struck me as both timely and necessary. What appealed to me most was the opportunity to bring scholars from diverse national backgrounds together to reflect on overlapping security concerns—particularly how many of our challenges are grounded in shared perceptions of Chinese behavior. This type of comparative analysis can promote much-needed transparency and cooperation among regional actors.
That said, I do see limitations in the current scope of contributions. As I mentioned in our conversation, the majority of participating voices come from U.S. allies or like-minded states.
I believe this tilts the project’s findings toward a certain consensus, and we risk missing important nuances from countries like Indonesia or Malaysia—states whose scholars may be more cautious in framing China as a threat. Their inclusion in future iterations of this project would broaden its legitimacy and analytical depth.
What stands out to me from the existing work is the diversity in how countries define “threat.” Some focus on actors, like Japan; others on specific behaviors or scenarios, as we see with Singapore. Australia’s case is unique in that our principal security concerns are less about territorial threats and more about economic security. We’re deeply exposed to China’s economy, and that interdependence carries both strategic value and risk. For us, internal developments within China—especially its looming demographic challenges—have significant implications.
China’s rapidly aging population, underdeveloped welfare systems, and shrinking workforce aren’t abstract issues. They’re real and likely to shape Beijing’s foreign policy in ways that affect all of us. If the Chinese Communist Party fails to deliver economic stability, it may resort to nationalistic narratives to preserve its legitimacy. In that scenario, external issues like Taiwan or maritime disputes could become symbolic outlets for internal pressures. From my perspective, we need to view China not just as a rational actor, but as a system facing internal breakdowns that could spill over into the region.
I also want to highlight an under-discussed issue: how countries in the region perceive the staying power of the United States. In Australia, we’re having an increasingly open debate about whether Washington remains a reliable security partner. This concern was exacerbated under the second Trump administration and persists in the background. Although the dominant policy position still supports the U.S. alliance, there’s growing unease, and we can’t afford to put all our strategic eggs in that one basket.
By contrast, in Taiwan, the reliance on the U.S. seems almost absolute—understandably so, given their geopolitical circumstances. But I think it’s crucial for this project to explore how other countries, especially those not formally allied with the U.S., view American engagement. There are likely to be sharp differences that reflect deeper strategic cultures and historical experiences.
For Australia, one of the most pressing strategic tasks is to strengthen regionalism. I don’t mean closing the region off—quite the opposite. What I’m advocating for is a model of open regionalism that welcomes cooperation from global players but is driven by regional actors themselves. ASEAN is instructive here. Despite its loose institutional structure, it has proven effective at avoiding conflict and maintaining strategic autonomy. If we can build on that model with countries like Japan, Korea, and New Zealand—where complementarities in labor, capital, and economic resources exist—we could foster a regional architecture that lessens dependence on China and encourages broader cooperation.
This project, in my view, should move toward identifying common threat perceptions across countries and then workshopping cooperative solutions. These solutions don’t need to be uniform but should be aligned—shared frameworks that reflect our common interests. For example, how do we respond collectively to coercive economic practices, territorial incursions, or information warfare? I’d like to see this project become a platform for generating policy ideas that regional governments might realistically adopt.
One more point I’d like to stress: the threat of Russia, while central to European concerns, doesn’t register the same way in our region. Except for Japan, few contributors mentioned it. In Australia, we’re deeply supportive of Ukraine and concerned about the erosion of international norms, but we don’t see Russia as an imminent threat to our security. That disconnect is important for European observers to understand—just as we must understand that not every regional actor views China the same way we do.
In sum, I think this project is making a valuable contribution. My recommendation is to broaden the range of voices, map shared concerns, and work toward common, actionable solutions. That’s how we’ll build the kind of resilient, inclusive Indo-Pacific that can navigate an increasingly complex strategic environment.